Curry, D. S. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850-877. doi:10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
[Abstract]Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
[Citing Place (1996c) in context]  

Ford, S. (2010). What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Queensland. philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=FORWFP
[Abstract]This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.
Note:
CHAPTER 8 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - OUTLINE 131 CHAPTER 9 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - DISCUSSION 137 9.1 Truthmakers for Dispositional Properties 137 9.2 The Causal Role of the Microstructure 140 9.3 Summary and Conclusions 141
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996e)]  [Citing Place (1996f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Jaworski, W. (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica, 91(2), 179-201.
[Abstract]Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Jaworski, W. (2017) Psychology without a mental-physical dichotomy. In W. M.R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & N, J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Chapter 11, pp. 261-291). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315211626-14
[Abstract]Is there a mental-physical dichotomy? Philosophers, scientists, and many ordinary folk seem to think so. We often speak of the difference between mental health and physical health, or between the mental aspects of athletic performance and the physical ones. In addition, standard definitions of psychology typically imply that it is the science of mental phenomena, and that the latter comprise a subject matter that distinguishes the methods of psychology from those of biology, chemistry, or physics. But the mental-physical dichotomy generates mind-body problems: persistent philosophical problems understanding how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. These problems suggest that there is a conceptual instability at the very foundations of psychological science. A hylomorphic metaphysic provides an alternative. It implies that there is nothing canonical about the mental-physical dichotomy; any distinctions we draw between mental and nonmental subject-matters or physical and nonphysical ones are mere artifacts of our descriptive and explanatory interests. This suggests an understanding of psychological science that is not based on a mental-physical dichotomy.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]